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Abstract. A System of Systems (SoS) is a group of independent constituent systems that by 
their interactions together deliver an emerging capability on which reliance is placed. In the 
UK Ministry of Defence Land domain, the appetite for uncertainty caused by SoS 
dependencies is particularly low. Dependability and assurance are therefore vital, both in the 
integration and interoperability of individual constituent systems, and at the level of the SoS as 
a whole. This paper presents the findings from a study, asking whether model-based 
engineering technologies could potentially deliver a pragmatic method for Land Open Systems 
Architecture (LOSA) SoS verification and assurance. We conclude that existing model-based 
SoS and Cyber-Physical Systems engineering techniques could potentially deliver a basis for 
LOSA SoS requirement engineering, design, verification and assurance. However, the 
techniques studied are at varying levels of maturity and therefore we identify areas of future 
work that could inform the ongoing research and experimentation programmes for LOSA and 
others across defence.  
1. Introduction 
A wide range of civil and defence capabilities are delivered by the collective operation of 
systems that are independent of one another. For example, successful completion of a military 
operation may involve multiple units from different services all with their own power and data 
networks, logistical systems, vehicles and units that may have evolved separately and may not 
have been conceived with collective operations in mind at all. As reliance is placed on the 
performance of these groups of systems, they merit consideration as systems in their own right 
(Maier 1998). Such systems are termed Systems of Systems (SoSs), and their successful 
creation, integration and maintenance presents considerable challenges (Dahmann 2014).  
Dependability is of vital importance both at the SoS level and in the integration and 
interoperability of the individual Constituent Systems (CSs) making up the SoS. It is therefore 
vital that stakeholders involved in system requirements, design, verification and assurance 
have evidence that increases their understanding of the interdependencies in an SoS, and thus 
confidence in trade-off decisions. In Land Open System Architecture (LOSA) – an approach to 
develop, ensure and assure coherence across the Land Domain – this requirement is 
particularly acute in the development of safety and reliability cases where the appetite 
uncertainty due to SoS dependencies is particularly low. 
Challenges in SoS engineering (SoSE) arise due to the limited information available about CSs, 
the need for clear descriptions of interactions between them, and the need for rigorous analysis 
of the SoS behavior that emerges from these interactions. Model-based techniques are 
 increasingly seen as a way of mitigating these complexities by encouraging the precise 
description of SoS architectures and CS interfaces, as well as providing means for systematic 
and possibly automated analysis of dependability properties. 
The contribution of this paper is to establish the feasibility of an approach proposed by UK 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) stakeholders that uses model-based SoS engineering (MBSoSE) 
as a means of providing stakeholders with the evidence needed to increase confidence in the 
LOSA programme. We establish this feasibility by assessing a set of design-time model-based 
techniques using an illustrative LOSA example with dependability requirements.  
In the remainder of the paper, we provide an overview of related work, outline and illustrate the 
technologies used, and conclude by considering their applicability and maturity for LOSA. 
2. Related Work 
We build on related work in three areas: model-based SoS engineering, dependability in SoSs 
and open systems in the defence domain.  
The systems engineer working in an SoS context faces challenges stemming from the lack of 
centralised authority over constituents, the complexity of predicting emergent behaviours, and 
the diversity of stakeholders (INCOSE, 2014). In common with other areas of Systems 
Engineering, there has been considerable interest in the use of model-based techniques as a 
way of addressing these challenges (Cantot and Luzeaux, 2011), (DoD, 2008), (Wang and 
Dagli, 2011). Recent EU projects have developed model-based technologies aiming to address 
SoSE. Both the COMPASS1 and DANSE2 projects piloted guidelines, patterns and tools for 
SoS modelling and verification (Andrews et al. 2014, Bryans et al. 2014, Ingram et al. 2015). 
Recent projects have also addressed multi-criticality (AMADEOS3), local/global optimisation 
(LOCAL4GLOBAL4), and dynamic management of physically coupled SoSs (DYMASOS5). 
Roadmaps for research and innovation in Europe (Road2SOS6 and CPSoS7) have emphasised 
the need for these developments. One of the most comprehensive reviews of the field (Nielsen 
et al., 2015) argues for modelling languages and methods able to describe the interoperability 
of networked, distributed constituent systems (one of the key motivations for open 
architectural approaches such as LOSA), and support simulation, with well-founded (“formal”) 
semantics to enable generation and maintenance of tests. 	
The field of systems dependability has been a subject of substantial study (Avižienis et al. 
2004) but its extension to systems of systems brings new challenges.  Chief among these is the 
necessity to define and validate dependability in the face of the emergent behaviour that 
characterizes systems of systems (Maier 1996) (Kopetz et al. 2015). Many approaches to SoS 
dependability have built on approaches to system dependability, and contractual styles similar 
to the one we propose here are popular – for example (Bryans et al. 2013), (Benveniste et al., 
2012), (Damm et al. 2011). These trace their origins to the Design by Contract approach 
introduced by Meyer (Meyer 1998).  
                                                
1 http://www.compass-research.eu/ 
2 www.danse-ip.eu 
3 www.amadeos-project.eu 
4 http://local4global-fp7.eu/ 
5 www.dymasos.eu 
6 www.road2sos-project.eu 
7 www.cpsos.eu 
 Within MOD, open systems are characteristically composed of modular cooperative 
components from several sources, the system is also not dependent upon any proprietary 
elements (Defence Committee UK. 2013). In recent years there has been a push within the 
MOD to achieve greater interaction between different systems in order to improve operational 
effectiveness across all Defence (MOD 2013b). Interoperability is a constant issue within 
defence, open systems enable the use of equipment which was procured at different times and 
contractors to be able to have “plug and play” functionality, allowing more capacity during 
upgrading and enables easing of interoperability with new capabilities (MOD 2012b).  
3. Approach to Model-based SoS Engineering 
This paper examines a sequence of design-time model-based techniques that may be used to 
implement a sequence of activities proposed by MOD stakeholders, form the basis of a 
pragmatic method to enable the assessment of dependability in the context of LOSA. Few if 
any single existing method is able to deliver the design needs of a LOSA SoS while satisfying 
stakeholder requirements. We therefore consider several techniques, using notations and 
methods from the SoSE and Cyber Physical Systems engineering (CPSE) disciplines.  
To undertake SoSE, we used SysML (OMG 2012, Holt et al. 2014), a semi-formal modelling 
language supported by industrial strength tools, and the experimental formal language 
COMPASS Modelling Language (CML) (Woodcock 2012), designed during the recent SoS 
project COMPASS and supported by the prototype Symphony tool platform (Coleman et al. 
2014).  For CPSE, we used the Crescendo tool (Fitzgerald et al. 2014), which uses the Vienna 
Development Method (VDM) (Fitzgerald et al. 2009) and 20-sim8. Given a sequence of 
activities defined by MOD, we use these techniques detailed below and in Table 1. 
1. Clarify and formally define the relationships between architectures, standards and 
implementations. We use a model-based ontology (Holt et al. 2014) to identify concepts 
in LOSA; including standards, implementation details and modelling terms. 
2. Understanding stakeholder roles to allow definition of what LOSA compliance 
means to stakeholders [...]. The study demonstrates an SoS requirements engineering 
technique (Holt et al. 2012) (applied in (Ingram et al. 2015) and (Andrews et al. 2014)) to 
identify stakeholders and place LOSA SoS requirements in context. This technique may be 
augmented with traceability links throughout an architectural model. 
3. Define the architectural framework representations required in support of 
stakeholder roles [...] including formal clarification of system boundaries within 
LOSA. The use of architectural modelling techniques, and in particular a pattern for 
defining Interface Contracts (ICs) (Bryans et al. 2014), that allows an SoS to be defined in 
terms of its CSs. Defining the interfaces between the CSs enables the explicit description 
of CS interactions and aids in clarifying the SoS boundary. 
4. [...] enable assessment and measurement of the dependencies between system 
boundaries to deliver evidence and confidence of the understanding of SoS behaviors 
and limitations to inform safety and reliability cases. The model-based techniques 
employed (SysML and CML) have associated analysis technologies which produce results 
we can use. The analysis technologies we used in this paper (formal model simulation 
(Coleman et al. 2014), fault modelling (Andrews et al. 2014) and co-simulation (Fitzgerald 
et al. 2014)) vary in their ease of use, and offer varying degrees of confidence to the user. 
                                                
8 http://www.20sim.com/ 
 5. Develop generic reference models for platform interoperability and platform 
integration. A contractual style of architectural modelling, advocated in the IC pattern, is 
a candidate for defining reference models, useful in integration and reasoning about 
interoperability. The pattern encourages the definition of an SoS model in terms of the 
assumptions and guarantees which are placed on the CS, enabling the analysis of 
integrating new CSs into the SoS. By defining the SoS contractually, the CSs which form 
the SoS must conform to those ICs – and may do this in which ever way they choose. 
6. Use models to deliver evidence and confidence for use in safety and reliability case 
developments as required throughout the lifecycle. The models and analysis results 
may be used to provide evidence and confidence to an SoS engineer. Using these as part of 
safety and reliability cases requires further investigation. 
Table 1: Techniques applied to sequence of MOD LOSA challenges 
Challenge Applicable Technique Technology Used 
1 Model-based Ontology Ontology Definition Viewpoint 
2 Context-based Requirements 
Engineering 
SoS-Approach to Context-based 
Requirements Engineering (SoS-ACRE) 
3 Architectural Modelling Interface Contract Pattern 
4 Model Analysis (formal model 
simulation, fault modelling and 
co-simulation) 
CML model simulation, Fault Modelling 
Architectural Framework and Crescendo 
co-simulation 
5 Architectural Modelling Interface Contract Pattern 
6 Models and analysis results 
4. SoS and CPS Engineering Techniques in Practice 
To demonstrate feasibility, we develop an illustrative example architecture, and a subset of the 
dependability concerns typical in a LOSA SoS. The purpose of the illustrative example is for us 
to define the scope of interest in this paper, and therefore we abstract from concrete 
implementation details. For the purposes of this study, we make some simplifications, as 
shown in the SysML Block Definition Diagram (BDD) in Figure 1. The example SoS 
comprises a Mounted Soldier, a Dismounted Soldier9, a Vehicle and a Patrol Officer. For the 
purpose of this example, we treat these four elements as individual CSs.  
 
Figure 1: Block Definition Diagram showing composition of the example SoS 
                                                
9 A soldier is classed as mounted if they are a member of the vehicle’s crew, otherwise they are 
dismounted. 
 The study exhibits many challenges typical in an SoS. The CSs are independent – in terms of 
their management, development and operation – may have evolved separately and may not 
have been conceived with collective operations in mind at all. This is at odds with the need for 
dependability in: the individual CS operations; CS-CS communication; and in the SoS-level 
behaviour. We employ an established definition of dependability (Avižienis et al. 2004) that 
divides the topic into: the attributes which comprise dependability; the threats to dependability; 
and the means that may be employed to ensure a system's dependability. In this study, rather 
than contrive an example to cover the full range of dependability properties, we have 
concentrated on a selected subset, in particular availability, reliability and safety. 
In a LOSA SoS, we have CSs with both digital and physical phenomena, and so we propose 
dependability properties related to computation/networks and physical issues. Beginning with 
discrete conditions and transitions of the feasibility example, we identify a set of three 
representative dependability properties: 
• Availability: What should we expect if the high bandwidth interface is not available? 
• Reliability: What if the low bandwidth channel loses a message? Are the individual logs 
recorded by the Soldiers and the Vehicle consistent? 
• Safety: Can we distinguish between safe and unsafe states? 
The next set of properties are in terms of a continuous variable, namely electrical power. This 
allows us to explore the techniques available to answer questions related to continuous time. 
We consider only availability and reliability in the context of continuous time properties: 
• Availability: What is the system behaviour if power goes below 9v? 
• Reliability: If power goes below 9v, will mission logs remain equal? 
In the remainder of this section, we present models developed, and analysis performed using 
those technologies defined in Table 1, using the illustrative example where relevant. Several 
technologies have been realized in previous work, and therefore for brevity, we summarize 
those efforts here, providing references to those works for interested readers. We return to the 
dependability questions and draw conclusions in Section 5.  Figure 2 illustrates the technology 
use flow (and the subsections of this paper in which they each appear); from ontology 
specification, through requirements engineering and architectural modelling to various 
model-based analyses. A solid arrow between the technologies indicates a strong link through 
either model translation or common modelling frameworks, a dashed arrow indicates an 
informal link between the technologies.   
 
Figure 2: Flow of modelling technologies used in example 
 4.1 Model-based Ontology 
We begin by explicitly defining the relationships between concepts LOSA, SoSs and the IC 
Pattern in an ontology presented as an Ontology Definition View (ODV) in Figure 2. The ODV 
 is a view from the COMPASS AF Framework (Holt et al. 2015), a framework for the definition 
of architectural frameworks.  
The ODV includes three main categories: Defence Standards (DefStans) (blue); Land domain 
concepts (green); and SoSs and ICs (brown). Relationships between the concepts are defined, 
for example; a Vehicle Platform conforms to the Generic Vehicle Architecture standard. Of 
importance in this work is the correspondence between MOD terms and those used in the SoSE 
domain. In the ODV, we state that a Land Deployment corresponds to a System of Systems and 
the different platforms correspond to Constituent Systems, which expose COIL Interfaces. The 
ODV states that a CS may conform to several ICs each of which also expose COIL Interfaces. 
The composition of a collection of ICs is defined as an IC-defined SoS. The SoS conforms to an 
IC-defined SoS. Finally, an SoS-level Contract governs the IC-defined SoS. 
 
Figure 2: Ontology Definition View for LOSA concepts 
4.2 Context-based Requirements Engineering 
Understanding stakeholder roles, requirements and the stakeholder perspectives on those 
requirements is a key concern in SoS engineering in LOSA. In addition, the ability to trace 
requirements from their source, through to model elements and analysis results is also of 
importance in complex SoSs. We consider the use of SoS-ACRE (Holt et al. 2012), the SoS 
Approach to Context-based Requirements Engineering, to help understand requirements and 
the contexts in which they may be considered. 
The SoS-ACRE technique proposes the identification of the different CSs of the SoS, and the 
identification of stakeholders. Having identified the study requirements, CSs and stakeholders, 
we may place the requirements in context. SoS-ACRE advocates analysing the requirements in 
the context of each separate CS, and then combining them on a separate, SoS-level view, the 
Context Interaction View. This is seen as a key part of SoS requirements engineering by 
providing an expanded view of requirements, presented in their separate contexts, for the entire 
SoS. This may be the first time that requirement and contexts are analysed together, and is 
helpful for identifying conflicts, inconsistencies and duplicated functionality. The SoS 
requirements are analysed in the context of the different CSs in Figure 5. In these diagrams, 
requirements are represented as use cases, and the CSs as ‘users’. Where a CS has some 
involvement or interest in a requirement, there is a link between the user and a use case.  
  
Figure 5: Context Interaction View of requirements – CSs    
4.3 Architectural Modelling 
Given a defined collection of requirements, and the contexts in which they apply, we may 
model the architecture of the SoS. We propose the use of modelling patterns and frameworks 
when defining LOSA architectural models. The first – the Interface Contract pattern – 
promotes a contractual approach to defining the CSs in terms of the obligations and reliances 
they may place on the other members of the SoS. The IC pattern is intended to allow the SoS 
engineer to specify limited internal behaviours to which CSs are required to conform to be a 
part of the SoS. CSs may conceivably conform to multiple ICs (and not necessarily ICs of the 
SoS of interest), and may conform to the IC in any way they wish. Defining the SoS using this 
pattern allows the engineer to analyse, and maintain, global emergent properties under SoS 
evolution and integration.  
The IC pattern, however, is focused on the data-based phenomena of SoSs. It enables the 
definition of data, operations to change data and the means to describe communications. 
Therefore, we extend the IC pattern to consider how flow-based properties may be modelled 
and used to enrich the contractually defined CSs. In LOSA SoSs the interfaces include: power, 
fuel, water and waste. The interfaces required differ between the different CS types. 
In this project we consider the feasibility of modelling such flows along with the contractual 
description for structure and behavior of ICs and extend the pattern to model: 
• Power-related values and inputs/outputs of CSs (extends the IC Identification View); 
• Flow of power between CSs (extends the IC Connections View (ICCV)); 
• Constraints based on physical properties (extends the IC Protocol Definition View); 
• Relationships between power-related values (incorporates use of Parametric Diagrams). 
In Figure 3 we show the modified ICCV, which now includes connectors with item flows, and 
depicts the flow of power from the Vehicle IC to the Mounted-Soldier Soldier IC.  In addition, 
we demonstrate the use of constraints on external power corresponding to requirements in the 
Generic Soldier Architecture standard (MOD 13a). Whilst this may be better suited as a 
uniquely defined requirement, we feel that representing this directly on the ICCV is also useful.  
  
Figure 3: Interface Contractual Connections Viewpoint including power flows and constraints. 
4.4 Fault Modelling 
One possible means of achieving dependability is for a system to tolerate faults. In SoS, this is 
a nascent area of research. The COMPASS project developed a Fault Modelling Architectural 
Framework (or FMAF), which complements the architectural modelling activity using the IC 
pattern. The FMAF allows engineers to consider how the different elements in an SoS may fail 
and identify possible consequences of those failures. The FMAF also allows an engineer to 
design redundancy into a SoS and consider recovery strategies.  
The FMAF comprises viewpoints for: identifying faults, errors and failures; defining causal 
links; and viewpoints for erroneous and recovery behavior. In this paper, we show a Threats 
Chain View in Figure 4. The figure shows a fault may be located in the mountedSoldier 
Soldier_IC, which may cause an error detected by that soldier which, if not recovered from, 
may cause the SoS failure. The remainder of the FMAF is applied in (Payne et al. 2015). 
 
Figure 4: Threat Chain View for scan equipment failure 
4.5 Formal Modelling 
Given a semi-formal, diagrammatic, model of the example SoS architecture, we consider the 
use of formal notations, which afford the use of formal analysis. In this study, we propose the 
use of CML (Woodcock et al. 2012). This notation is based on well-established formal 
languages (VDM (Fitzgerald et al. 2005) and CSP (Hoare 1978)) with a formal mathematical 
 semantics. The language allows the modelling of data, functionality, event ordering and 
communication, and is extensible. The language, developed in the COMPASS project, has an 
associated tool platform, Symphony10, containing a broad range of formal analysis techniques. 
Prototype tool support has been developed for translating models from SysML into CML. 
Previous work has explored the definition of formal models from an architectural model 
defined using the IC pattern (Bryans et al. 2014).  
Symphony provides a collection of analysis tools to validate and verify a CML model: 
• the Interpreter and RT-Tester used for requirement validation, 
• the Theorem prover and Model checker may be used for property verification, 
• the Static Fault Analysis plugin allows FMEA and fault tree analysis, 
• and external links allow distributed SoS engineering. 
Simulation can be partially automated by developing CML processes that embody specific 
tests, and running these in parallel with the system under test.  This allows us to conduct both 
positive and negative tests (intended to test the absence of incorrect behaviours), and these 
processes can be derived directly from the views of the IC pattern. 
4.6 Co-modelling and Co-simulation 
In a co-model, we model both the software and hardware elements of the LOSA SoS. The 
software elements are modelled using a discrete-event (DE) notation (we use VDM-RT), and 
hardware using continuous-time (CT) notation (such as differential equations). In simulation, 
DE models only represent points in time at which the state changes, and provide good 
abstractions for software (e.g. data types, object-orientation, threading). However, they are less 
suited for physical system modelling. In contrast, in CT model simulation the state changes 
continuously through time. CT models have good abstractions for physical system disciplines 
(e.g. mechanical, electrical and hydraulic system elements) but typically offer poor support for 
modelling software. Using co-modelling techniques, we define both DE and CT models and 
define a contract to allow them to be simulated together. We use the Crescendo tool11 for 
co-modelling; taking advantage of the Overture tool12 and 20-Sim13 for DE and CT modelling 
respectively. We model a LOSA SoS with one vehicle and two mounted soldiers drawing 
power from the vehicle. The power use from the two soldiers changes over time.  
 
Figure 6: SoS-level 20-sim block diagram connected by signals and energy bonds  
                                                
10 http://www.symphonytool.org/ 
11 http://www.crescendotool.org/ 
12 http://www.overturetool.org/ 
13 http://www.20sim.com/ 
 Having defined the DE and CT models and the co-model interface, the models can be 
simulated. We use the Crescendo tool to enable this co-simulation. We encode a simple 
scenario in the DE model which uses the different mounted soldier function modes over time. 
The scenario can be summarised using the graphical output in Figure 7. In the chart titled 
MS1_Scan Function (lhs of Figure 7) the power used changes as the Scan function changes 
mode: predicting coordinates (175W); turned off (0W); image processing (250W) and 
reviewing playback (125W). 
 
Figure 7: Co-simulation results 
In Figure 7, in the chart labelled MS1_GPS Function, the function changes from standby mode 
(50W) to a relay position mode (175W) periodically. This corresponds to the GPS unit sending 
the position to some central command on a regular basis. 
Given these scenario-based power uses, the ‘complex’ controller of the battery charger will use 
power to charge the soldier's battery (300W) when it is appropriate to do so. In this particular 
controller policy, we state that the battery may be charged when the total power being 
consumed by other functions is less than 200W. This results in a power usage as shown in 
Figure 8, in the chart labelled MS1_BatteryCharge. 
  
Figure 8: Co-simulation results 
In the chart labelled MS_1TotalPower in Figure 8, shows the resultant total power usage. This 
chart displays the consequences of the different controllers in terms of the total power used by 
the mounted soldier. The design decisions made result in a potentially unsatisfactory situation, 
where power spikes are produced where the power being drawn temporarily increases to 600W, 
until the battery controller reacts and stops charging the battery.  
This is a powerful result in that the software designer may better understand the consequences 
of policy design at an early stage of development and may choose a different strategy; for 
example, using forecasting, shorter sensing periods, or some distributed control algorithms. 
5. Conclusions 
In the study reported in this paper, we identified and assessed the use of several model-based 
technologies. This assessment is to establish the feasibility of a pragmatic method of assessing 
safety and reliability dependencies of an SoS in the LOSA context. The result of this study is 
that such a method is feasible. In this section, we provide a brief assessment of the suitability of 
the techniques for dependability assessment in the LOSA context.  
  
 
Table 2. Techniques/ dependability properties matrix 
5.1 Dependability  
In Table 2 we list the five dependability-related questions across the top, and the various 
techniques considered in this feasibility study on the left-hand side. Broadly speaking, the 
discrete techniques (the first five) are most applicable to the first three questions (columns 1, 3 
 and 5) and the co-modelling/co-simulation techniques are most applicable to the questions that 
involve power considerations.  
Using the different discrete techniques (architectural modelling, formal modelling, formal 
analysis and fault modelling), we can model systems being unavailable, unreliable 
communications media and distinguish between safe and unsafe states. Using simulation of a 
formal model, we may explore the consequences of a LOSA SoS which is not dependable. 
Fault modelling allows us to explore the threats to dependability in a SoS and understand the 
relationships between faults in a SoS (due to CSs being unavailable/unreliable) and the failures 
which may occur as a consequence.  
Co-modelling and co-simulation techniques allow us to model continuous variables – relating 
to power, for example – in notations that are able to represent continuously changing values, 
and explore the interaction between digital and physical phenomena. This technique allows us 
to consider dependability and fault tolerance in a network-connected SoS in which both data 
and power are present and interact.  
5.2 Modelling in LOSA 
Model-based Ontology The model-based ontology using an Ontology Definition View has 
proved to be a valuable tool. We were able to clarify and formally define the relationships 
between architectures, standards and implementations. This clarity proved useful throughout 
the project and was a useful communication tool. Although by itself an ontology does not allow 
the assessment of SoS dependencies, it formed a basis for the rest of the work. 
Context-based Requirements Engineering We demonstrated a requirements engineering 
technique that allows requirements to be placed in the context of SoSs – SoS-ACRE. Although 
the technique is somewhat cumbersome, top-level requirements can be broken down into their 
implications for individual stakeholders and these can be analyzed visually for any conflicts 
between stakeholders. Identifying such conflicts is can help avoid the failure to meet SoS-level 
requirements. Model-based requirement engineering techniques also allow trace links from 
requirements through to model elements. This provides the possibility of developing methods 
for dependability-specific requirement engineering.  
Architectural Modelling: Interface Contract Pattern We demonstrated the use of 
semi-formal modelling technologies – namely the Interface Contract pattern in SysML. This 
provided many advantages: consistency checking of the defined model allows for rigorous, 
consistent models and in general semi-formal (diagrammatic) models have good potential as a 
communication mechanism and are readily understandable by engineers. Furthermore, the 
(potentially automated) link to formal notations provide the option for advanced analysis 
techniques such as model checking and theorem proving. Whilst the SysML tool support is 
mature, the IC technique has been demonstrated only using pilot studies. Further investigation 
is needed to take this to a higher Technology Readiness Level (TRL). The architectural 
modelling allowed the assessment of the dependability of the LOSA SoS using model review 
and exploration.  In our case this review was conducted informally. 
Model Analysis We demonstrated a formal version of the feasibility example using CML, and 
simulated its behavior using the Symphony tool, in order to ensure that SoS was capable of 
executing the scenario, and to increase our confidence in the original design. Whilst formal 
techniques are improving, they are not of high enough TRL for deployment in their “raw” form. 
Full integration with established modelling techniques (e.g., SysML) is vital, in order to take 
advantage of systematic analysis of dependability properties.  Furthermore, they are typically 
 designed for and applied in discrete domains. We did not apply model checking or theorem 
proving here.  
The Fault Modelling Architectural Framework (FMAF) helps the SoS engineer to understand 
“what if” scenarios in the same modelling framework as the architecture models produced with 
the IC pattern. This is due to the fact that the FMAF has been incorporated into the SoS 
engineering approach, via a fault modelling SysML profile.  The FMAF proved valuable in 
identifying and managing causal chains leading to potential system and SoS failures, in 
understanding the consequences of dependability threats and in designing recovery strategies.  
Co-modelling allows engineers from different domains to model an SoS and the CSs in their 
own notations and, along with co-simulation, enables trade-off analysis, design space 
exploration and fault modelling. This project used VDM-RT for modelling software, 20-Sim 
for modelling physical systems and the Crescendo tool for co-simulation. The technology used 
in this study is used primarily in embedded and CPS modelling. Fully incorporating it into an 
SoS engineering approach will require more effort, with multi-tool chains and diverse 
notations suitable for different stakeholders. 
The co-modelling and co-simulation techniques have the potential to aid analysis and 
assessment of dependability properties, especially in contexts which integrate discrete and 
continuous domains. This is of great importance within LOSA, where the CSs of the SoS are 
connected with both data and physical interfaces. 
6. Future Work 
The SoS and CPS engineering techniques we have shown form a feasible basis for a pragmatic 
approach to assessing reliability dependencies, although the different elements are at different 
levels of maturity. Further investigation would be needed to incorporate the different 
technologies into different frameworks for use in LOSA. For example, it may be possible to 
incorporate the approach into MODAF.  This would be helped by the already consistent 
definitions and use of viewpoints and ontology. We outline areas of future work in this section. 
1. We have concentrated on technologies produced in the COMPASS and DESTECS EU 
projects. Further study will compare these model-based technologies with potential 
alternatives. This comparison must also take into account cost-effectiveness and usability 
dimensions, and will aid in understanding the impact of incorporating new technologies in 
normal SoS engineering practice in LOSA. 
2. An assessment is required to determine the potential to integrate with relevant defence 
engineering processes and standards (such as MODAF) and to input to future LOSA 
standards and the rules governing the integration of CSs (the “joining” rules).  
3. The modelling techniques investigated used a simple feasibility example and in cases, 
notably requirements engineering, was only able to provide a partial treatment of the 
technologies. A full treatment of stakeholder requirements modelling including 
requirements that span both DE and CT elements of a LOSA SoS is required. 
4. The co-modelling technologies assessed do not provide a contractual style of modelling as 
demonstrated in the architectural modelling techniques, deemed useful in SoS engineering. 
An integrated method for contractual modelling and co-modelling in LOSA would be 
valuable. It would allow a unified approach to representation and simulation of models of 
systems which have both software and physical properties at the SoS-level. 
5. Several methodological approaches are available with co-modelling, including 
design-space exploration (DSE). The application of DSE in LOSA should be considered to 
 aid in understanding power requirements over the life time of system, and may be useful 
for maintenance and cost models of LOSA SoS.  
6. The various modelling technologies provide analysis results in the form of simulations, 
semi-formal model review, formal analysis and co-simulation. These results need to be 
placed in the context of safety cases in LOSA to determine how model-based techniques 
may be used as evidence in safety and dependability cases.  
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